Abstract
The number of adjustable parameters in a model or hypothesis is often taken as the formal expression of its simplicity. I take issue with this `definition ' and argue that comparative simplicity has a quasi-empirical measure, reflecting experts' judgements who track past use of a model-type in or across domains. Since models are represented by restricted sets of functions in a suitable space, formally speaking, a general `measure of simplicity ' may be defined implicitly for the elements of a function space. This paper sketches such a framework starting from intuitive constraints. It is shown how experts' judgements feed into this framework and how the usual definition can be recovered. A theorem by H. Akaike in the theory of model-choice has recently been used to shine new light on the relationship between the demand for simplicity and empirical success, or even `truth '. The approach favored here permits an alternative answer based on a reliabilist account of justification: if judgements of simplicity track past successful use of a model-type comparative simplicity is evidential and inductive.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
| Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106768-0 |
| ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 106768 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 11. Sep. 2023 13:43 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Sep. 2023 10:24 |
| DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |

