Abstract
One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461-508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106770-0 |
ISSN: | 0353-5150 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 106770 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 11. Sep. 2023, 13:43 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Sep. 2023, 10:25 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |