Abstract
One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461-508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106770-0 |
ISSN: | 0353-5150 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 106770 |
Date Deposited: | 11. Sep 2023, 13:43 |
Last Modified: | 29. Sep 2023, 10:25 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |