Abstract
Which issue-related motives underlie voters' decision to switch parties at the polls? Do switchers stick to the newly chosen party, or do they oscillate in a short-term way at intermediate elections? Relying on the behavioral theory of elections, we assumed aspiration-based voting of boundedly rational voters. We elicited issue-related switch and stay motives in an open-ended survey question format to identify the individual dominant aspirational frame. We traced the respondents' voting trajectories over three consecutive elections, including two state (2013 and 2018) elections in Bavaria (Germany) and one German federal election (2017). We focused on one of the most polarizing and salient issues in these elections, namely immigration. The case of reference is the 2018 Bavarian state election. Here, the incumbent majoritarian center-right party Christian Social Union tried to deter the entry of the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany by adapting to it on the immigration issue in tone and position. The selected case allows assessment of the impact of issue-based adaptive behavior of the incumbent party at the level of the voters' switch or stay choices. We estimated the direction and number of voter flows for two interelection sequences of different lengths between different types of polls (federal and state). Our transition estimates are based on the hybrid multinomial Dirichlet model, a new technique integrating individual-level survey data and official aggregate data. Our estimates uncover substantial behavioral differences in the immigration issue public.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Sozialwissenschaften > Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 320 Politik |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106822-9 |
ISSN: | 0032-3470 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 106822 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 11. Sep. 2023, 13:44 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Sep. 2023, 17:29 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |