The Differentiation Paradox of European Integration: Why Going it Alone Produces Suboptimal Results

Biermann, Felix (2022): The Differentiation Paradox of European Integration: Why Going it Alone Produces Suboptimal Results. In: Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), Vol. 61, No. 2: pp. 344-361

Abstract

Differentiation is not only a design feature of European integration, it is also a Member State strategy to overcome preference divergence. However, putting together an optimal group is difficult: Either the resulting club lacks the capacity to produce the club good efficiently;or differentiation attempts lead to an equally suboptimal outcome of a club too large and too heterogeneous to be effective. This paper develops an explanation of this differentiation paradox. When an avant-garde group proposes differentiation, the presence or absence of its go-it-alone power determines the outcome. The former leads to suboptimally large clubs due to the bandwagoning dynamic that produces a cascade. By contrast, the absence of go-it-alone power triggers a blockade and results in suboptimally small clubs. This actor-centred approach to differentiated integration is tested by analysing the establishment of Permanent Structured Co-operation in security and defence, which declined from an ambitious idea into a diluted reality.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Social Sciences > Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science (GSI)
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
• ISSN: 0021-9886
• Language: English
• DFG: Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892