Abstract
. This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo-Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo-Russellian theory.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-108945-9 |
ISSN: | 0040-5825 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 108945 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 29. Feb. 2024, 08:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Feb. 2024, 08:49 |