Advocacy in European Civil Societies: Organizational Trade-offs Between Selective and Collective Incentive Provision

Bolleyer, Nicole und Correa, Patricia (2022): Advocacy in European Civil Societies: Organizational Trade-offs Between Selective and Collective Incentive Provision. In: Social Forces, Bd. 101, Nr. 2: S. 864-889

Abstract

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are a cornerstone of democracy in Europe. Nonetheless, civil society and political society should not be equated as membership-based organizations are not necessarily politically engaged. This paper theorizes and empirically examines which membership-based CSOs engage in interest representation through sustained advocacy activity. We propose an incentive-theoretical framework on CSO investments in advocacy activities-a collective, non-exclusive incentive from which also non-members can profit-by organizations fundamentally dependent on member support. Theorizing how CSOs' own structural characteristics, resource dependencies, and government demand for CSO input affect how CSOs reconcile selective and collective incentive provision, we test our hypotheses using new data from four recent surveys conducted in four European democracies. In line with our framework, CSOs organizing individual citizens rather than corporate actors and those pursuing member interests are less likely to engage in advocacy, while CSO professionalization and state funding access enhance CSOs' propensities to do so. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the former structural CSO characteristics are similarly relevant for CSO advocacy across distinct country settings, while the role of resource variables is mediated by institutional context revealing an important source of inequality in democratic interest representation.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Sozialwissenschaften > Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 320 Politik
• ISSN: 0037-7732
• Sprache: Englisch