Abstract
A key to understanding regulation through private intermediaries is how third-party actors are selected and controlled. This paper examines the question in prostitution policy, a value-loaded policy field that stimulates regulators to carefully select private intermediaries to avoid regulatory capture. By means of a novel data set on prostitution policy in 25 OECD countries (1960-2010) as well as with a comparative case study on two German states, the paper discovers that the responsibilization of private intermediaries is a slowly diffusing phenomenon, accompanied by strong public oversight. Moreover, the selection of private regulatory intermediaries is an ideology-driven process in which the congruence in (moral) goals is key for the establishment of any relationship, while regulatory capacities are secondary. Thus, private intermediaries generally rule under a shadow of moral hierarchy in prostitution policy. This emphasis on shared moral goals enriches the young research on regulatory intermediaries with a largely disregarded selection criterion, which is able to reduce the risk of regulatory capture by private actors in delicate regulatory areas.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Sozialwissenschaften > Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 320 Politik |
ISSN: | 1748-5983 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 110957 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:22 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:22 |