Abstract
We show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 112296 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:35 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:35 |