Abstract
Many philosophers have argued that logical pluralism is not compatible with the normativity of logic. They developed different versions of the collapse argument: if two logics are correct, then the weaker one will be normatively irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that the collapse argument is based on a controversial premise: the assumption that every logic can be characterized by the same bridge principle. I provide a solution to the collapse argument based on the modification of this premise, maintaining both logical pluralism and the normativity of logic.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0020-174X |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 112943 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:43 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 02. Apr. 2024, 07:43 |