Abstract
Many philosophers have argued that logical pluralism is not compatible with the normativity of logic. They developed different versions of the collapse argument: if two logics are correct, then the weaker one will be normatively irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that the collapse argument is based on a controversial premise: the assumption that every logic can be characterized by the same bridge principle. I provide a solution to the collapse argument based on the modification of this premise, maintaining both logical pluralism and the normativity of logic.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0020-174X |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 112943 |
Date Deposited: | 02. Apr 2024, 07:43 |
Last Modified: | 02. Apr 2024, 07:43 |