Counterfactual cognition and psychosis: adding complexity to predictive processing accounts

Rappe, Sofiia und Wilkinson, Sam (2022): Counterfactual cognition and psychosis: adding complexity to predictive processing accounts. In: Philosophical Psychology, Bd. 36, Nr. 2: S. 356-379

Abstract

Over the last decade or so, several researchers have considered the predictive processing framework (PPF) to be a useful perspective from which to shed some much-needed light on the mechanisms behind psychosis. Most approaches to psychosis within PPF come down to the idea of the atypical brain generating inaccurate hypotheses that the typical brain does not generate, either due to a systematic top-down processing bias or more general precision weighting breakdown. Strong at explaining common individual symptoms of psychosis, such approaches face some issues when we look at a more general clinical picture. In this paper, we propose an update on the current accounts of psychosis based on the realization that a neurotypical brain constantly generates non-actual, de-coupled, counterfactual hypotheses as part of healthy cognition. We suggest that what is going on in psychosis, at least in some cases, is not so much a generation of erroneous hypotheses, but rather an inability to correctly use the counterfactual ones. This updated view casts accurate cognition as more fragile and delicate, but also closes the gap between psychosis and typical cognition.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• Sprache: Englisch