Abstract
One of Glennan's ([1996]) most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his reductive analysis of higher-level causation in terms of mechanisms. In this article I employ causal Bayes nets (CBNs) to reconstruct his analysis. This allows for identifying general assumptions that have to be satisfied to get the analysis working. I show that once these assumptions are in place, they imply (against the background of the CBN machinery) that higher-level causation indeed reduces to interactions between component parts of mechanisms. I also briefly discuss the plausibility of these assumptions and some consequences for the mechanism debate.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
| Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
| ISSN: | 0007-0882 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 113072 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2024 07:44 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 02. Apr. 2024 07:44 |
