Peirce, Pedigree, Probability

Stewart, Rush T. und Sterkenburg, Tom F. (2022): Peirce, Pedigree, Probability. In: Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society, Bd. 58, Nr. 2: S. 138-166

Abstract

An aspect of Peirce's thought that might still be underappreciated is his resistance to what Levi calls pedigree epistemology, i.e., to the idea that a central focus in epistemology should be the justification of current beliefs. Somewhat more widely appreciated is his rejection of the subjective view of probabil-ity. We argue that Peirce's criticisms of sub-jectivism, to the extent that they grant that such a conception of probability is viable at all, revert back to pedigree epistemology. A thoroughgoing rejection of pedigree in the context of probabilistic epistemology, how-ever, does challenge prominent subjectivist responses to the problem of the priors.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 0009-1774
• Sprache: Englisch