
Abstract
Many countries have automatic wage tax withholding systems with tax non-filing options for some taxpayers. We show that this has sizable and potentially unintended implications for effective taxation because taxes are often over-withheld. Low-income taxpayers pay more taxes than they have to because they frequently do not file. Using German administrative tax data, we document that the average non-filer overpays € 119 in one year, equivalent to a percentage point increase in the average tax rate. Non-filing acts as a form of “reverse evasion”: It weakens the effective tax progressivity by increasing tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-125236-0 |
ISSN: | 00472727 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 125236 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 08. Mai 2025 14:52 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 08. Mai 2025 14:52 |