Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly

Hu, Luke (February 2012): Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 377

Abstract

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Procurement, auctions, industrial organization, mechanism design
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D21, D43, D44, D45
• Language: English