
Abstract
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.
Item Type: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | Procurement, auctions, industrial organization, mechanism design |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D21, D43, D44, D45 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13177-2 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13177 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:05 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |