Abstract
We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se.
Item Type: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | Differentiated products, separation of ownership and control, private benefits of control |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | L13, L41 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13204-3 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13204 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:06 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |