Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. (October 2010): Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 336

Abstract

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if the synergies are low, bidders are subject to a positive externality. Nevertheless, pooling does not occur; and the profit-share auction is strictly more profitable than the first-price auction, regardless of whether firms observe the synergy parameter or only the winning bid before they play the oligopoly game.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: Horizontal mergers, takeovers, auctions, externalities, oligopoly
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: G34, D44, H23, L13, D43
• Language: English