Abstract
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification prevents unraveling so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one considers the buyers' buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect certification does exist.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | certification, unraveling, separating equilibrium |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A1 - Allokationsmechanismen in Organisationen und Märkten |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82, L15 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13230-7 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13230 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:07 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |