A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas (März 2010): A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 310

Abstract

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

• Dokumententyp: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: Auctions, Mechanism Design, Knapsack Problem, Dominant Strategy, Budget, Procurement
• Fakultät: Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D21, D44, D45, D82
• Sprache: Englisch
• ID: 13244