A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ensthaler, Ludwig und Giebe, Thomas (March 2010): A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 310

Abstract

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Auctions, Mechanism Design, Knapsack Problem, Dominant Strategy, Budget, Procurement
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D21, D44, D45, D82
• Language: English