Abstract
Consider a situation where person A undertakes acostly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to A's intentions. We vary the probability that the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that expected rewards do not spoil the perceived kindness of an action and the action's rewards.
Item Type: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | social preferences, intentions, beliefs, psychological game theory, experiment |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D03, D64 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13252-9 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13252 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:07 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |