Abstract
Consider a situation where person A undertakes acostly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to A's intentions. We vary the probability that the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that expected rewards do not spoil the perceived kindness of an action and the action's rewards.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | social preferences, intentions, beliefs, psychological game theory, experiment |
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D03, D64 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13252-9 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 13252 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012 13:07 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:53 |

