
Abstract
We show that incompetitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individuals.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | career competition; contest; mediocracy |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, J44, J45, M51 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13268-8 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13268 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:07 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |