Abstract
Is free-riding in teams reduced when one member receives a signal on his colleagueís performance? And how does free-riding depend on the signal's type? We address these questions in experimental teams in which two agents sequentially exert effort to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice and find that agents work more when signals are available. Overall, behavior differs from predictions of standard theory. Signals that are predicted to have no effect are, in fact, influential and signals that are predicted to have an effect are redundant.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Team production, Free-riding, Experiment, Information, Signal |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C92, J30, M50, D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13277-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13277 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:07 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |