Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 (September 2009): Complementary Patents and Market Structure. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 274 [PDF, 232kB]

Warnung
Es gibt eine neuere Version des Dokumentes.
[thumbnail of 274.pdf]
Vorschau
Download (232kB)

Abstract

Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovation

Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten