
Abstract
The literature on public goods has shown that e?cient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions e?ciency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, e?ciency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro?t-maximizing ?rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Public goods, Mechanism Design, Incomplete Contracts, Regulation |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B3 - Unternehmenskontrolle, Unternehmensfinanzierung und Effizienz |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D02, D82, H41, L51 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13287-3 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13287 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:08 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |