Abstract
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition |
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13291-9 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 13291 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012 13:08 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:53 |
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