Ding, Wei; Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
(June 2009):
Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 261
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Abstract
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.