Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

Ding, Wei; Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar G. (June 2009): Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 261

Abstract

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Language: English