| Kranz, Sebastian und Ohlendorf, Susanne (April 2009): Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 259 |
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Abstract
We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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| Keywords: | renegotiation, infinitely repeated games, side payments, optimal penal codes |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | C73, L14 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13293-1 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| ID: | 13293 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016 09:09 |
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