Abstract
We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | renegotiation, infinitely repeated games, side payments, optimal penal codes |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C73, L14 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13293-1 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13293 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:08 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |