Abstract
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | law and economics, incentives, crowding out, experiment |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D63, D64, C99 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13322-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13322 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:08 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |