Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment

Hörisch, Hannah (February 2008): Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 230

Abstract

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: law and economics, incentives, crowding out, experiment
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse; Economics; Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D63, D64, C99
• Language: English