Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver and Harbring, Christine (October 2007): Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 219

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agents’ previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: tournament, commitment problems, feedback, experiment
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C91, D83, J33, M52
• Language: English