Efficient Inequity–Averse Teams

Li, Jianpei (Mai 2007): Efficient Inequity–Averse Teams. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 210

Abstract

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: moral hazard, team production, inequity aversion
• Fakultät: Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: C7, D7, D63, L2
• Sprache: Englisch