| Li, Jianpei (May 2007): Efficient Inequity–Averse Teams. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 210 |
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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| Keywords: | moral hazard, team production, inequity aversion |
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C7, D7, D63, L2 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13342-9 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 13342 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:53 |
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