Abstract
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency’s total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it generalizes this index to a more general cost function, thereby highlighting the context specificity of the original criterion. Finally, it suggests a redefinition of tasks under which the criterion prevails.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | incentives, multi-tasking, performance measurement |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82, M52 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13348-2 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13348 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:09 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |