
Abstract
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency’s total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it generalizes this index to a more general cost function, thereby highlighting the context specificity of the original criterion. Finally, it suggests a redefinition of tasks under which the criterion prevails.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | incentives, multi-tasking, performance measurement |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D82, M52 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13348-2 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13348 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:09 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |