Abstract
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | limited liability, piece rates, risk aversion, risk-incentives trade-off |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D01, D82, J3, M5 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13351-9 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 13351 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012 13:09 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 12:53 |

