License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Giebe, Thomas und Wolfstetter, Elmar G. (April 2007): License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 199

Abstract

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: patents, licensing, auctions, royalty, innovation, R&D, mechanism design
• Fakultät: Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D21, D43, D44, D45
• Sprache: Englisch