Abstract
In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers hut also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard "retail minus X regulation" may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.
Dokumententyp: |
Paper
|
Keywords: |
Resale regulation, wholesale, spatial product differentiation, non-spatial product differentiation, vertical restraints |
Fakultät: |
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B3 - Unternehmenskontrolle, Unternehmensfinanzierung und Effizienz
Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
Themengebiete: |
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: |
D43, L11, L42, L51 |
URN: |
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13354-5 |
Sprache: |
Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: |
13354 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: |
10. Jul. 2012, 13:09 |
Letzte Änderungen: |
04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |
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Two Tales on Resale. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012, 13:09)
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