Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision making while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of secession rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | country size, public spending, structure of government |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D7, H1, H2, H7 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13364-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13364 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:09 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |