Abstract
According to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of organizations. Typically, we expect that highly profitable firms are always founded but it is not clear whether the same is true for firms with less optimistic prospects. We will show that internal rent seeking may lead to a completely reversed result. The impact of internal rent seeking on overall investment and the implications of firm size and competition on the foundation of organizations are also addressed.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | contests, foundation of organizations, internal rent seeking |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D2, L2, M2 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13383-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13383 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:09 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |