Abstract
According to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of organizations. Typically, we expect that highly profitable firms are always founded but it is not clear whether the same is true for firms with less optimistic prospects. We will show that internal rent seeking may lead to a completely reversed result. The impact of internal rent seeking on overall investment and the implications of firm size and competition on the foundation of organizations are also addressed.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | contests, foundation of organizations, internal rent seeking |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D2, L2, M2 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13383-6 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13383 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:09 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |