Schweinzer, Paul
(June 2006):
Labour market screening with intermediaries.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 138
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Abstract
We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.