Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the frequently observed phenomenon of “inefficient micromanagement”. I show that a supervisor may get comprehensively involved into activities of a subordinate although a better option of delegation is available. This inefficiency persists in the absence of conflict of preferences and even as the cost of delegation becomes zero. The paper also demonstrates that imposing constraints on communication with a subordinate can be beneficial for a superior.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13421-8 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13421 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |