Veto-Based Delegation

Mylovanov, Tymofiy (January 2005): Veto-Based Delegation. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 129

Abstract

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: veto power, asymmetric information, principal-agent relationship, no monetary transfers.
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D78, D82, L22, M54
• Language: English