
Abstract
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is selected by her opponent rather than by herself. In the model, the buyer has limited wealth and in addition to acquiring one good from the seller can purchase a different good from a competitive market. The positive relation between the values of these goods is what delivers our result.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C72, C78, D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13424-4 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13424 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |