
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. Frequently, foreign direct investment is financed in the host country without an international capital movement. We develop a model in which the optimal choice of financing an international investment trades off the relative costs and benefits associated with the allocation and effectiveness of control rights resulting from the financing decision. We find that the financing choice is driven by managerial incentive problems and that FDI involves an international capital flow when these problems are not too large. Our results are consistent with data from a survey on German and Austrian investments in Eastern Europe.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Multinational firms, Firm specific capital costs, Internal capital markets, International capital flows |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B5 - Weltwirtschaftliche Integration und die neue Firmenorganisation Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of International Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | F23, F21, G32, L20, D23 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13425-0 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13425 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |