
Abstract
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | contest design, multi-tasking, effort incentives |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A2 - Konflikte in Organisations- und Steuerungsproblemen Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13426-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13426 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |