Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall

Gürtler, Oliver (May 2006): Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 112

Abstract

In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is assumed to either value early or recent impressions more strongly. It is shown that effort may increase or decrease, as the probability of promotion in a certain period gets higher. The single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Promotion Tournament, Promotion Probability, Imperfect Recall
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: J33, M51, M52
• Language: English