Abstract
We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | conflict, social contracts, asymmetric information | 
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A1 - Allokationsmechanismen in Organisationen und Märkten | 
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13457-7 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 13457 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012 13:10 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 12:53 | 
 
		 
	 
    



