Abstract
We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | conflict, social contracts, asymmetric information |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A1 - Allokationsmechanismen in Organisationen und Märkten |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13457-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13457 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |