Abstract
We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the New Basel Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we show that the introduction of an internal ratings based (IRB) approach improves upon flat capital requirements if the approach is applied uniformly across banks and if the costs of implementation are not too high. However, the banks’ right to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches under Basel II gives larger banks a competitive advantage and, due to fiercer competition, pushes smaller banks to take higher risks. This may even lead to higher aggregate risk-taking.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Basel II, IRB approach, bank competition, capital requirements, SME financing |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B3 - Unternehmenskontrolle, Unternehmensfinanzierung und Effizienz |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | G21, G28, L11 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13463-0 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13463 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |